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but not ineffectiveness. Regarding the KP, not only its formal and defined rules but also the 
demonstration of the intention to cooperate was bound to influence emissions’ reduction. 
Domestic institutions were more influential than the effects of KP international institution. 
However, political, legal rights, and economic institutional qualities presented distinct 
effects over emissions’ mitigation.
Keywords: Climate governance; Institutional quality; International Institutions; Kyoto 
Protocol; Difference-in-difference model
Resumo
Este estudo analisou a eficácia do Protocolo de Kyoto (KP) e sua relação com as instituições 
internas, considerando-o como uma instituição internacional utilizando uma estimação 
de diferenças-em-diferenças. Os resultados indicaram, no geral, baixa eficácia, mas não 
completa ineficácia. Concernente ao KP, não somente as regras formais definidas, mas 
também a demonstração de intenção em cooperar influenciaram a redução de emissões. 
As instituições domésticas foram mais influentes do que os efeitos do KP como instituição 
internacional. No entanto, os efeitos de redução de emissões decorrentes das instituições 
políticas, de direitos legais e das econômicas foram distintos.
Palavras-chave: Governança Climática; Qualidade Institucional; Instituições Internacionais; 
Protocolo de Kyoto; Modelo Diferenças em diferenças
Resumen
Este estudio analizó la efectividad del Protocolo de Kioto (KP) y su relación con las 
instituciones internas, considerándolo como una institución internacional utilizando un 
estimador de diferencias-en-diferencias. Los resultados indicaron, en general, baja eficacia, 
pero no completa ineficacia. Con respecto al KP, no solo las reglas formales establecidas, 
sino también la demostración de la intención de cooperar influenció la reducción de 
emisiones. Las instituciones domésticas fueron más influyentes que los efectos del KP 
como institución internacional. Sin embargo, los efectos de la reducción de emisiones de 
las instituciones políticas, de derechos legales y de las económicas fueron distintos.
Palabras Clave: Gobernanza climática; Calidad institucional; Instituciones internacionales; 
Protocolo de Kioto; Estimador de diferencias en diferencias
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Introduction
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014), 
despite the international efforts to reduce the world’s Greenhouse Gases (GHG) 
emissions during the first decade of 2000s, total world’s yearly emissions’ average 
growth rate had increased more in the 2000-2010 period than in the prior four 
decades (+1.3%/yr compared to +2.2%/yr). In addition, data from the World 
Bank (2017) indicates that average country emissions rose by 40% in 2012 compared 
to 1990. On one hand, there had been skepticism against the effectiveness of 
international environmental regimes, which claimed that global climate risk 
mitigation would be too weak or too slow owing to the lack of cooperation; 
while, on the other hand, the learning process obtained from them demonstrated 
a lot of opportunities that can assist in the process of international governance 
of climate challenge (Stern 2016; Haas 2000; Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins 2003; 
Rosen 2015).
Concerning international cooperation to mitigate pollutant emissions, such as 
GHG, countries can attempt to free-ride instead of complying, because cooperation 
is not solely dependent on “human motivations” (e.g., altruism, idealism, honor ), 
nor only explained by rational choices (e.g., benefit-cost, optimization) (Keohane 
1988; Sandler and Arce 2003). Moreover, free riding is possible because the benefits 
are shared, while the costs are individualized (Young 2013), and sovereign parties 
seeking different goals and priorities are embedded in the international arena, 
which network implies that every party is interdependent of the other (Keohane 
1984; Mitchell 2013; Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003). As a consequence, one of 
the difficulties lies in setting the responsibilities that each country would bear, 
since countries’ capabilities to mitigate emissions also differ (Adger et al. 2003; 
Paavola and Adger 2005; Jänicke 1992).
The country’s strategies are influenced by domestic affairs, such as politics, 
socio-economic context, and technology (Martin and Simmons 1998; Keohane 
1988). Furthermore, domestic institutions can influence a country’s socio-
economic performance (North 1990; Acemoglu et al. 2015) and assist in improving 
environmental governance (Paavola 2016; Ostrom 2010; Adger 2001). The countries’ 
domestic interests to comply with international environmental policies are bound 
to influence the effectiveness of international environmental institutions, such 
as KP (Martin and Simmons 1998; Young 2013).
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However, a question that remains is: had the KP and its international 
repercussion not existed, would emissions be higher? Since there is no 
counterfactual world, the answer hardly will be precise. The aims of this study 
are much more modest but close in meaning. We compared the performance of 
a group of countries (treatment) based on their average trend of emissions over 
time, against the trend of emissions of another group (control) over the same 
period. We adopted distinct treatments to assess whether distinct implemented 
levels of KP as an international institution were effective to alleviate the trend 
of emissions in certain groups more than in others, based on KP’s (UNFCCC 
2008) and its reference in the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) document (UN 1998).
Our first hypothesis considers that the distinct implemented levels of KP 
were important to alleviate the trend of emissions in the respective groups over 
the period (Keohane 1984; Young 2013). Our second hypothesis concerns that 
cooperation with KP goals is influenced by domestic institutions (Mitchell 2013; 
Martin and Simmons 1998; Cortell and Davis 1996). We employed a difference-
in-difference statistical approach (Lechner 2010) to retrieve the isolated effect 
of KP to test the first hypothesis; and considered three indicators of domestic 
institutional quality, built by Kuncic (2013), in the model estimation to account 
for the second one.
Following this introduction, the rest of the paper is organized into four 
other sections: in the next section, the theoretical framework, we elaborate 
the consideration of KP as an international institution and its relationship with 
domestic institutions; the third section, the methodology, explores the difference-
in-difference statistical model and we outline the treatment and control effects 
and the periods employed in the analysis. The fourth section displays the results 
and discusses them, while the fifth section presents the final remarks.
Theoretical framework
Although GHG emissions impact the entire planet through the greenhouse 
effect, they have a defined source, which implies that countries must shoulder 
the costs individually when committed to enforcing KP. Meanwhile, the benefits 
of reducing the detrimental risks associated with climate change are shared 
among all. However, the information about the tangible benefits of reducing GHG 
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emissions (mitigation) is unknown and varies according to the society, region, or 
party involved (Sandler and Arce 2003; Nordhaus 2015; Paavola and Adger 2005). 
Since the costs are countries’, domestic politics and agenda might be considered 
in the process of compliance or denial (Cortell and Davis 1996; Keohane 1984).
For instance, Sunstein (2007) considered that United States withdraw the 
ratification of KP because it would be economically worse off in case of compliance. 
Notwithstanding, in the case of the Montreal Protocol, the United States should 
be better off. According to Veiga (2013), the possibility of alternative technological 
innovations to address Chlorofluorocarbons’ (CFCs) functionalities and pressures 
from the civil society regarding the ozone layer depletion made United States adopt 
unilateral regulations before the group of European countries in denial, which 
France and United Kingdom stood out. The achievement of cooperation is bound 
to benefit from contracts set among parties, which are formal institutions that 
alleviate transaction costs by attenuating uncertainty (North 1990; Paavola 2006). 
The more parties are involved, the higher will be the level of interdependency and 
complexity, which escalates the volume of transaction costs (Paavola and Adger 
2005; North 1990). As a result, international markets are bound to carry both 
domestic transaction costs and the complexity of coordinating the international 
arena (North 1999).
When the source of pollution is local, pressure from civil society to adopt 
more environmentally sustainable measures is to be considered (Cole, Rayner, 
and Bates 1997; Cole 1999; Paavola 2016). However, the likelihood of succeeding 
is reduced if the distribution of rights and concessions is concentrated in the 
polluter’s hands(Coase 1960; Paavola 2016; 2006). The higher is quality of 
domestic democratic institutions plays a role by reducing the power gap among 
the parties involved owing to the distribution of power and decision-making 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2016; Acemoglu et al. 2015). Similarly, pressures over 
the national government to commit to the international environmental agenda 
might be more feasible if domestic actors converge into a sustainable agenda 
(Levy, Haas, and Keohane 1992; Lijphart 2012; Lijphart and Crepaz 1991).
Sub-national representatives that lobby for a national agenda priority can 
reinforce their goals by calling to multilateral international organizations, or 
even appeal to them because their and national interests did not converge. 
Regarding the latter, sub-national representatives would seek legitimation of 
international organizations to domestic (individual) affairs (Cortell and Davis 
1996). Legitimacy bears the collective acceptance by the society that legal rights 
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can be enforced. Regulations, policies, auditing, and legal rights are created by 
domestic authorities, but their legitimacy is the root of its effectiveness (Andresen 
and Hey 2005). The concession of property rights under legal rights institutions 
is what allows the actors who possess the rights to decide over the quantity of 
pollution is produced. The polluters, whose property rights were established 
by legal rights, can bargain with the civil society for acceptable pollution levels 
efficiently. However, in the presence of transaction costs, an efficient bargain 
hardly is achieved (Coase 1960). Moreover, the distribution of property rights 
can lead to even more pollution if the design of legal rights favors polluters or 
does not back up civil society (Paavola 2006). 
The flexibility of institutions assists its effectiveness because it provides 
robustness and resilience: an institution that is able to adapt to changes in the 
environment without distancing itself from its initial purpose. On one hand, 
inflexible institutions may lack governance during changes. On the other hand, 
too much flexibility of a government can prove ineffective. Robustness can be 
measured as persistence over time, and an effective institution is likely to be also 
robust and transparent (Underdal and Young 1997; Young 2013). The discourse 
in the international arena during the 2000s was conciliatory towards seeking 
economic and social development rather than the global north’s approach to 
environmental challenges, such as climate change (Andresen and Hey 2005). 
According to Rosen (2015), apart from the aggregate performance of Europe, the 
great majority of countries would have not been able to reduce its emissions 
according to KP goals. The KP could have created regulations that focus on 
the short-term mitigation pathways more than the long-term structural and 
institutional changes, which could have reduced its effectiveness (Aldy, Barrett, 
and Stavins 2003; Rosen 2015).
Interaction among institutions can support and reinforce them, be it either 
domestic (Sunkel 1989; North 1990) or international (Gehring and Oberthür 2009; 
Oberthür 2001). Moreover, not only KP can be favored by domestic actions since 
the reduction of GHG emissions can also be beneficial to the learning process 
or building capacity to address other environmental institutions (Gehring and 
Oberthür 2009; Young 2013). However, not all institutions’ outcomes can be 
beneficial to the environment, society, and equity altogether, and in some cases 
institutions are bound to reproduce and perpetuate inequalities and inequities 
(Robinson and Acemoglu 2012; Acemoglu and Robinson 2016; Paavola 2016; 
North 1990; Mahoney 2000).
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Methodology
The difference-in-difference (DD) estimator was adopted to evaluate the 
effectiveness of a policy intervention or policy changes (treatment) on a group 
by contrasting the outcomes between the treated group after the treatment and 
the non-exposed group (control) within the same period (Lechner 2010; Abadie 
2005). DD models are panel data models involving the subtraction of two other 
differences: the first difference is between the period of time before and after the 
treatment, and the second one is between treatment and control. Using the DD 
procedure, one can isolate the policy’s effect, which is the combination between 
the average treatment effect (former difference) and within the policy’s active 
period (latter difference) (Abadie 2005).
For the time difference, this study considered the difference of the average 
emissions of all parties in the model corresponding to three distinct periods: (P1) 
the difference between the average emission’s trend4 in (1991-1997) period against 
the (1998-2012) period, since countries that ratified might have been preparing 
to reduce emissions, which might have carried over the entire period (Oberthür 
2001); (P2) the difference between (1991-2004) and (2005-2012), because it is 
the period that KP entered into force; and (P3) the difference between (1991-
1998) and (2008-2012), which is the first commitment period of KP. The overall 
period consisted of from 1991 to 2012, which we detail in the next sub-section.
Table 1 displays the treatment and control groups (former difference) to be 
considered in the DD estimations. We considered four categories of treatment 
to assess the distinct implemented levels of KP as an international institution 
(Mitchell 2013; Keohane 1988; Underdal and Young 1997), based upon the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) base text 
of the KP (UN 1998) and the Kyoto Protocol Reference Manual (UNFCCC 2008). 
Firstly (a), we assess the effect of the early intention to participate in the KP, 
based upon the signature of the Convention’s text from March 1998 to March 
1999 and its posterior ratification (UNFCCC 2021a). The demonstration of early 
intention might concern domestic public acceptance of the governor, preserving 
4 One implication of the methodological choice when considering the trend of emissions, instead of base 
year’s relative emissions (i.e., Table II-1 from UNFCCC (2008)), is that this comparison does not focus on 
the assessment of KP rule’s effectiveness, but does consider the effectiveness based on the influence buffers 
created by KP institutional arrangement. In complement to this study, future ones are encouraged to assess 
the differences among KP rules and their respective mitigation effectiveness taking into account the base 
year’s relative emissions.
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a spot in the international arena, or the prior existence of built infrastructure or 
technology to mitigate emissions (Veiga 2013; Keohane 1984).
Table 1 – Treatment and control groups for the estimation of DD average group 
effects of distinct implemented levels of Kyoto Protocol
Treatment Control Difference-in-difference effect groups
RA No-RA
a)  Among all countries in the sample, the difference between the 
countries that signed and ratified (RA) the Convention's text 





b)  Among the countries that RA the Convention's text, the 
difference between those which had binding emissions targets 





c)  Among the countries that did not have targets in KP, the 
difference between the countries that RA and the countries that 




d)  Among the countries that had binding targets in KP, the 
difference between the countries with binding targets for the 
first commitment period (P3) and the countries categorized as 
Economies in Transition.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
We considered in the treatment (b), the effect of having binding emission 
reduction targets accorded in the KP (UNFCCC, 2008, 13), which corresponds 
to the countries of Annex B in the Convention Text (UN, 1998, 24) , among the 
countries that signed and ratified the protocol’s text to detail treatment (a). 
Regarding the treatment (c), it represents the group of countries that belong to 
Non-Annex I parties, which targets were not defined, but signed and ratified 
the Convention’s text (UNFCCC 2021b). The treatment (c) aimed to assess if 
the countries that showed intention, even though without binding targets, could 
have emitted less than its counterpart that did not show intention. Lastly, the 
treatment (d) considered the group of countries whose targets were defined by 
the KP, i.e. Annex B countries, but scrutinize the effect of Economies in Transition 
(UNFCCC, 2008, 13) on emissions’ trend.
Concerning the statistical model, we consider  as the DD estimator;  
the emissions level;  the international institution effect, where  
represents the treatment groups displayed in Table 1. Additionally,  
represents the time effect, where  stands for 1991-1997, while  associates 
P1, P2, and P3 to the models. Equation (1) represents the overall effectiveness 
of the KP (Abadie 2005; Lechner 2010).
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(1)
The expected value of the DD estimator ( ) is to be at least non-positive, 
which would indicate that the trend of emissions after the treatments, on average, 
was not higher in the treatment group than the trend in the control group. In the 
case of a negative and statistically significant effect, it would indicate that the 
trend of emissions after the treatment on the treated group was lower than the 
trend of emissions in the control group. Conversely, if the parameter is positive, 
the treatment was not effective to restrain the trend of emissions within the given 
period relative to the control performance.
The panel model follows Equation (2).
(2)
Where  is the emissions of carbon dioxide for each country  at a time 
 represents the vector of control variables that can influence emissions; 
 stands for the vector containing domestic institutional quality indicators; 
 is the binary variable for treatment effect;  is the binary 
variable for the time period;  is the effectiveness of the KP due to interaction 
between both binary variables; and  is the stochastic error in the regression.
The time effect, i.e. , considers the average trend of emissions before the 
treatment and after the treatment for all sampled groups (treatment and control). 
The  parameter captures whether all countries in the sample presented a lower 
(if negative) or higher (if positive) trend of emissions after the treatment. That is, 
for example, if all countries sampled in the model had technological enhancements 
over the period that reduced the level of emissions, ; meanwhile, suppose 
that , this would indicate that the isolated effect of the treatment was 
not likely to be the responsible for the emissions’ trend alleviation.
Hence, the ‘effectiveness’ of the KP that we considered in this study is based 
upon the average effect of emissions’ trend alleviation in the treatment group 
compared to its control, after the treatment. This analysis is able to assess the 
isolation of global institutional effects of Table 1’s treatment effects, that are: 
sign and posterior ratification of the Convention’s text (UNFCCC’s text to KP 
(UN 1998)); the effect of binding targets in KP (UNFCCC 2008); the effect of 
early intention combined with countries without targets; and the effect of a clear 
commitment period to reduce emissions (UNFCCC, 2008, 13).
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To address the endogeneity of variables, in special economic income per 
capita (Arrow et al. 1995; List and Gallet 1999), and the endogenous relationship 
between domestic and international institutions (Gehring and Oberthür 2009; 
Martin and Simmons 1998), we employed a System Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) model specification (Arellano and Bover 1995). The System GMM 
uses the lag of the dependent variable and the past observations of independent 
variables as instrumental variables. We employed the Hausman statistical test 
(Hausman 1978) to verify the validity of the instruments. Moreover, we tested 
the autocorrelation of residuals starting from the second lag using the Arellano-
Bond test (Arellano and Bond 1991).
Variables and data
The control variables are intended to control for deviations in the dependent 
variable (GHG emissions) owing to economic fluctuations and energy use 
heterogeneity across countries: we employed GDP per capita (constant thousand 
2010 US$) and energy consumption per capita (kt of oil equivalent), which both 
were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). The 
dependent variable is the KP’s GHG emissions per capita based on carbon dioxide 
equivalent emissions, also obtained from WDI. These data were transformed 
into logarithms and named  for carbon dioxide emissions,  for GDP, 
and  for energy consumption.
The quality of domestic institutions proxy variables was taken from (Kuncic 
(2013) dataset and ranges from 1990 to 2010, which we interpolated until 2012 
using the moving average estimated values. One of the strengths of this dataset is 
its distinction among legal, political, and economic institutional quality. Another 
consideration is the robust estimation of institutional quality indexes, which 
were obtained by multivariate statistical analysis as a combination of a myriad 
of institutional proxies and indexes (Kuncic 2013). The Legal institutional index 
( ) considered the degree of enforcement of property rights, the effect of laws 
and regulations, the impartiality of justice organizations and actors; and we 
employed this index as a proxy to the enforcement of legal and property rights 
(North 1990; Coase 1960; Paavola and Adger 2005). The Political institutional 
index ( ) was based on freedom of press, corruption, and bureaucracy, political 
rights; and we included in our model to address power distribution and the level 
of democracy (Paavola 2006; 2016; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005; 
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Acemoglu and Robinson 2016). The Economic institutional index ( ) combined 
indicators such as: the economic freedom; the regulatory quality of credit, labor 
and business; and also, foreign ownership and investment restrictions; and we 
used in our model to assess the economic conditions which countries operate 
under (Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins 2003; Williamson 1985).
The full model is presented in Equation (3), where  is the constant:
(3)
The effectiveness of KP is assessed by , where the statistical significance 
of  indicates that KP institutional effect was able to mitigate emissions 
by reducing the trend of emissions during the period. The significance of  
indicates that the trend of GHG emissions in P1, P2, or P3 were lower than the 
trend from 1991 to 1997. Lastly, the significance of  means that the emissions’ 
trend within the treatment group was lower than the trend of the control group, 
despite the period (i.e. including the time prior to 1998).
Results and discussion
Results
This section shows the results for the unbalanced panel data system GMM 
model. The overall period analyzed ranged from 1991 to 2012 and included up 
to 124 countries and (2244 observations) in treatment (a), while 63 (1258 obs.), 
86 (1538 obs.), and 33 countries (660 obs.) correspondent to treatments (b), (c), 
and (d), respectively. Twelve models were estimated in total, by considering three 
distinct periods (P1, P2, and P3) and four treatments (Table 1). For all twelve 
models, statistical validity tests were conducted individually, which showed 
the absence of autocorrelation was rejected but not rejected in the second lag 
(Arellano and Bond 1991; Arellano and Bover 1995). In addition, the validity of 
the instruments was not rejected at a 10% confidence level (Hausman 1978).
Table 2 displays the results for the first treatment in Table 1, a), which 
corresponds to the difference of KP’s effect for the group of countries that signed 
and ratified against the group that did not. Only the time difference between 
1991-1997 to 1998-2012 (P1) was statistically significant among the DD effects 
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and the treatment effect of RA. The positive effect of the time trend (0.033) 
indicated that the average trend of emissions from 1998 until 2012 was higher 
than the average trend in the prior period. All parameters concerning domestic 
institutions were statistically significant, but only political institutional quality 
indicated lower emissions levels for countries with higher PII, on the average 
for all the samples. The effect of energy use (approx. 0.130) was the opposite of 
GDP’s (-0.107). Lastly, the influence of past emissions was significant and positive 
up to two years, but its coefficient value in the second year ( ) presented a 
lower magnitude. That is, emissions from the previous year were carried over 
to the current period by 0.66% per 1.00% that had been emitted; and this effect 
is reduced in the second year prior to 0.35% per 1.00%.
Table 2 – DD effect between signed and ratified (RA) the Convention’s document 
and did not sign or did not ratify it (No-RA) over emissions’ trend, 1991-2012
Variable Coef. 1998 S.E. Coef. 2005 S.E. Coef. 2008 S.E.
DD Effect -0.030 ns (0.02) -0.034 ns (0.03) -0.047 ns (0.03)
Treatment (a) -0.003 ns (0.01) 0.008 ns (0.01) 0.004 ns (0.01)
Time trend 0.033 ** (0.01) 0.016 ns (0.02) 0.035 ns (0.03)
Legal Rights Inst. 0.439 *** (0.16) 0.418 *** (0.16) 0.420 ** (0.16)
Political Inst. -0.383 ** (0.17) -0.401 ** (0.17) -0.389 ** (0.17)
Economic Inst. 0.185 ** (0.08) 0.219 *** (0.08) 0.220 *** (0.08)
GDP -0.107 *** (0.04) -0.104 *** (0.04) -0.110 *** (0.04)
Energy Use 0.129 *** (0.04) 0.127 *** (0.04) 0.132 *** (0.05)
Constant -0.207 ns (0.19) -0.222 ns (0.20) -0.202 ns (0.20)
0.664 *** (0.06) 0.660 *** (0.06) 0.658 *** (0.06)
0.355 *** (0.06) 0.364 *** (0.06) 0.361 *** (0.06)
***; **; *; ns: 1%, 5%, 10% and not statistically significant.
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 3 shows that the trend of emissions was higher in P2 for the group of 
countries in treatment (b), compared to the countries that did not have binding 
targets. On average, the countries with higher domestic legal rights and economic 
institutions indexes presented a higher level of emissions in comparison to 
countries with respective lower institutional quality. The effect of GDP and 
energy use was similar to Table 2. The emissions from 1 and 2 years prior were 
carried over to the present at, approximately, 0.59% and 0.41%, respectively.
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Table 3 – DD effect between the group of countries which had binding emissions targets 
in KP and those which did not have targets, among countries that RA, 1991-2012
Variable Coef. 1998 S.E. Coef. 2005 S.E. Coef. 2008 S.E.
DD Effect 0.007 ns (0.02) 0.043 * (0.02) 0.021 ns (0.02)
Treatment (b) 0.001 ns (0.01) 0.000 ns (0.01) 0.004 ns (0.01)
Time trend -0.002 ns (0.01) -0.025 ns (0.02) -0.013 ns (0.01)
Legal Rights Inst. 0.346 * (0.20) 0.312 * (0.19) 0.339 * (0.18)
Political Inst. -0.380 ns (0.25) -0.396 ns (0.26) -0.392 ns (0.28)
Economic Inst. 0.137 ns (0.10) 0.164 * (0.09) 0.152 * (0.09)
GDP -0.111 *** (0.03) -0.102 *** (0.03) -0.103 *** (0.02)
Energy Use 0.160 *** (0.03) 0.154 *** (0.04) 0.157 *** (0.05)
Constant -0.278 *** (0.27) -0.281 ns (0.23) -0.322 ns (0.25)
0.584 *** (0.11) 0.589 *** (0.12) 0.589 *** (0.09)
0.420 *** (0.10) 0.410 *** (0.09) 0.412 *** (0.08)
***; **; *; ns: 1%, 5%, 10% and not statistically significant.
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 4 indicated that the average trend of emissions of Non-Annex I countries 
that signed and ratified the Convention’s text was lower than those which did not 
ratify, for P2. For P1, the group of countries that signed and ratified before being 
classified as Non-Annex I showed a lower trend of emissions than the group of 
countries that did not RA. However, still considering P1, the overall sample’s 
trend of emissions had risen after 1998 in comparison to the prior period. The 
influence of domestic institutions, energy use and GDP, and previous emissions 
level were similar to Table 2’s.
Table 4 – DD effect between the countries that RA and the countries that did not RA, 
among the group of countries that belonged to Non-Annex I, 1991-2012
Variable Coef. 1998 S.E. Coef. 2005 S.E. Coef. 2008 S.E.
DD Effect -0.011 ns (0.03) -0.068 * (0.04) -0.064 ns (0.04)
Treatment (c) -0.027 * (0.02) 0.019 ns (0.02) 0.007 ns (0.02)
Time trend 0.042 ** (0.02) 0.018 ns (0.02) 0.038 ns (0.03)
Legal Rights Inst. 0.698 *** (0.24) 0.623 *** (0.20) 0.641 *** (0.22)
Political Inst. -0.604 ** (0.24) -0.614 *** (0.23) -0.611 *** (0.23)
Economic Inst. 0.184 ns (0.14) 0.272 ** (0.14) 0.261 * (0.14)
GDP -0.118 ** (0.05) -0.122 ** (0.06) -0.129 ** (0.06)
Energy Use 0.148 ** (0.06) 0.155 * (0.08) 0.156 ** (0.08)
Constant -0.204 *** (0.35) -0.236 ns (0.37) -0.181 ns (0.35)
0.622 *** (0.06) 0.620 *** (0.06) 0.619 *** (0.06)
0.372 *** (0.06) 0.381 *** (0.06) 0.379 *** (0.06)
***; **; *; ns: 1%, 5%, 10% and not statistically significant.
Source: Own elaboration.
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In Table 5, the Annex B countries, including the EIT (whole sample), presented 
an increase in the emissions’ trend between 2008-2012, in comparison to 1991-
2007. In contrast with the previous treatments (a-c), the effect of the legal rights 
index was negative, while the effect of political institutions was positive, for all 
three periods. There was no significant difference in emissions level regarding 
GDP nor energy use. The emissions from the previous year were heavily carried 
to the subsequent year.
Table 5 – DD effect between the countries with binding targets for the first 
commitment period (2008-2012) and the countries categorized as Economies  
in Transition, among Annex B group, 1991-2012
Variable Coef. 1998 S.E. Coef. 2005 S.E. Coef. 2008 S.E.
DD Effect -0.037 ns (0.03) -0.007 ns (0.02) -0.033 ns (0.03)
Treatment (d) 0.020 ns (0.03) -0.009 ns (0.01) -0.004 ns (0.01)
Time trend 0.005 ns (0.01) 0.023 ns (0.01) 0.034 * (0.02)
Legal Rights Inst. -0.330 *** (0.11) -0.262 ** (0.11) -0.278 ** (0.12)
Political Inst. 0.336 *** (0.12) 0.337 *** (0.13) 0.348 *** (0.11)
Economic Inst. 0.058 ns (0.10) 0.018 ns (0.10) 0.033 ns (0.09)
GDP -0.029 ns (0.05) -0.047 ns (0.04) -0.055 ns (0.04)
Energy Use 0.163 ns (0.14) 0.193 ns (0.14) 0.220 ns (0.16)
Constant -1.049 *** (0.91) -1.148 ns (0.90) -1.254 ns (0.95)
0.980 *** (0.07) 0.987 *** (0.06) 0.971 *** (0.06)
***; **; *; ns: 1%, 5%, 10% and not statistically significant.
aThe second lag was not statistically significant in the equations in all three periods.
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 6 shows the likelihood of KP effect according to the DD effect estimates 
(i.e. the effect of treatment group while in P1, P2, or P3, disregarding the control 
group and the time effect of treatment during 1991-1997, before P1). The null 
hypothesis of  stands for the effect that KP was at least not harmful to 
increase emissions’ trend. The p-values that are shown are the probabilities of not 
rejecting the given hypothesis. The treatments displayed in Table 6 correspond 
to the same as Table 1’s, and the tests were conducted based on the models 
displayed in Tables 2 to 4.
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Table 6 – One-sided p-value results for at least non-detrimental effect of KP,  
1998-2012, 2005-2012 and 2008-2012 for treatments (a) to (d) in Table 1
Period 1998-2012 (P1) 2005-2012 (P2) 2008-2012 (P3)
Null Hypothesis
a) Ratify (RA) 0.949 0.051 0.887 0.113 0.928 0.072
b) RA: Annex B 0.361 0.639 0.031 0.969 0.148 0.852
c) Non-Annex I 0.643 0.357 0.957 0.043 0.928 0.072
d) Annex B: EIT 0.905 0.095 0.618 0.382 0.873 0.127
Source: Own elaboration.
Based on the treatments (a)-(d) effects, the greatest likelihood of negative (or 
null) differences in emissions, on the average, was among the group of countries 
that RA the Convention’s text in comparison to the group of countries that did not 
sign or did not ratify it. Conversely, the lowest likelihood of negative difference 
in emissions’ trend had been among the countries that presented binding targets 
of mitigation in KP, in comparison to those countries that did not have targets. 
Noteworthy, both groups among the lowest likelihood of negative trend had RA. 
The DD estimation in the period from 2005-2012 in comparison to 1991-1997 
presented the lowest chances of alleviating the trend of emissions, on the period 
average. However, regarding the average from 1998, when UNFCCC’s document 
was opened to signature, to 2012, which was the end of the first commitment 
period of KP, the likelihood of at least a non-positive trend of emissions was 
increased.
Discussion
In general, the isolated effect of the treatments (a)-(d), regarding distinct 
implementation levels of KP (DD effect on Tables 2 to 5), showed no statistically 
significant results according to the models, which implies that there is a chance 
of the effects being null, except for treatment (b) and (c) in P2. Furthermore, 
the likelihood of these effects being at least not positive (Table 6) indicated that 
there was a distinction of treatment effects among the different implementation 
levels of KP. 
On the one hand, the distinct likelihoods of  showed that not only 
formal rules were important to endorse the goals of KP as an international 
institution, but also discourse and repercussion played a complementary role in 
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supporting cooperation (Mitchell 2013; Levy, Haas, and Keohane 1992). Countries 
that signed in 1998 and 1999, when the UNFCCC’s Convention document was 
open to signing, demonstrated an early intention to cooperate with the agreement, 
which action, aligned to the international discourse on climate responsibility, 
could have coped with an interest of repositioning the country in the international 
arena (Andresen and Hey 2005; Rosen 2015). In the time comparison P2 (2005-
2012), three out of the four DD coefficients showed a decline in the likelihood 
of reduced emissions’ trend in the treated groups (a), (b), and (d). While in the 
1990s the international discourse was focused on climate responsibility, also 
owing to the Montreal Protocol, the following decade experienced a discourse 
more focused on economic and social development and growth, which may have 
hindered KP intentions (Andresen and Hey 2005; Veiga 2013; Sunstein 2007).
The treatment (c) in P2 (2005-2012) was a key period-treatment combination 
because the treatment considered the countries within the Non-Annex I group, 
which were expected to raise emissions owing to socioeconomic development, 
meanwhile P2 was the period when KP entered into force (UNFCCC 2008). 
Nevertheless, as the decision of RA the protocol’s text had started a decade 
prior and included Non-Annex I countries in DD effect, KP resonance could be 
effective to restrict emissions (UN 1998). Despite not having targets, Tables 4 and 
6 showed that the treatment (c) group presented a reduced trend of emissions 
and an increase in the likelihood of . The results reported that for Non-
Annex I countries that did RA, the chances of having the group’s emissions 
trend lower than the group of Non-Annex I countries that did not RA were much 
higher in P2 than in the previous decade. The statistically significant parameter 
of  (Table 4) and the increase in the likelihood compared to P1 (Table 6) 
might be because that the treatment group (c) would have emitted much more 
emissions without KP.
On the other hand, the effectiveness of overlapped implementation levels 
of KP and the Convention’s document was likely to be non-linear, and not 
necessarily more effective, such as the opposite effects in treatments (b) and 
(d). While the treatment (b) indicated a reduction of the likelihood of 
, among the countries that RA the Convention’s text, the treatment (d) showed 
that the chances of  increased for having RA and a commitment period to 
binding mitigation targets (Gehring and Oberthür 2009; Oberthür 2001). The not 
significant effects from treatment (b) and the reduction of its chances of  
in P2 and P3 relative to P1 (Tables 3 and 6) might indicate that actions were taken 
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considering short-term mitigation efforts, instead of long-run transformations 
(Rosen 2015; Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins 2003). This corroborates the idea that 
the implementation level of treatment (b) and, especially in P2, KP was not very 
robust as an international institution, which might be associated to overextended 
flexibility (Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins 2003; Oberthür 2001; Underdal and Young 
1997).
The period-treatment combination of P3 and treatment (d) regards the 
difference between Annex B countries and EIT ones, specifically to the period 
of commitment to Annex B targets, but not to EIT. The likelihood of  
was recovered in P3, compared to its fall in P2 from P1 (Table 6), meanwhile, 
the effect of time trend (Table 5) was statistically significant and displayed an 
increase in the overall group’s trend of emissions in the first commitment period. 
These results indicate that the effect of binding targets for the first commitment 
period could have constrained GHG emissions, in spite of the pressure to increase 
emissions, as indicated by the time trend. However, although the isolated effect of 
KP binding targets was more likely to restrict emissions in P3, the not statistically 
DD coefficient in Table 5 indicated that it was not enough to reduce the trend 
of emissions consistently.
Tables 2 to 4 indicated that domestic institutions that improve power 
distribution and enhance democracy could have played an important role to 
support and even enable mitigation in national and international jurisdictions 
(Paavola 2016; Ostrom 2010). Not only more democratic institutions can provide 
the inclusion of environmental targets into the domestic agenda based on public 
appeal (Cole 1999; Paavola 2006), but also more individualized interests from 
local actors might contribute to mitigation policies (Cortell and Davis 1996; 
Broto and Bulkeley 2013). Despite the possibility of supporting environmental 
governance without a government scale down to regional and local actions 
(Young 2013), a limitation to these actions is that, in general, legal rights are 
sanctioned in superior scales, which comes down to the difficulty in rivaling 
them from localized scales (Paavola 2016).
As a consequence, legal rights bonded to pollution control can also be 
ineffective or inefficient (Rosen 2015; North 1990; 1999), because property 
rights that are given to polluter actors, whose power is likely to be greater than 
society’s, especially in less democratic countries, are bound to perpetuate and 
induce defect of environmental policies at sub-national scales (Paavola 2006; 
Hardoy and Lankao 2011; Hardoy and Pandiella 2009). From our model, it is 
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suggested by the positive coefficients for LII and EII, which represents that 
countries with higher enforcement of legal rights and higher economic freedom 
could have increased their trend of emissions. This corroborates that domestic 
and international institutions are linked (Cortell and Davis 1996), but not an 
improvement on any institution might be beneficial to improve international 
(and even domestic) environmental targets, because the institutional design is 
indicated to be an essential feature to achieve policy outcomes (Rosen 2015; 
Veiga 2013; Paavola 2016; 2006; Kuncic 2013).
However, as in Table 5 regarding the Annex B countries, once national or 
sub-national instruments to reduce emissions are adopted, its acceptance by the 
actors are conditional to already existing institutional and physical arrangements, 
which legal institutions are likely to reverberate in customs, traditions, and power 
distribution (Lijphart 2012; Paavola 2006; Jänicke 1992). While legal rights were 
beneficial to GHG mitigation, the same countries whose democracy quality was 
higher performed worse in emissions reduction (Table 5). These results suggest 
that legal and property rights bindings could have constrained pollution, while 
democratic pressure might not have legitimated these constraints. Despite being 
the opposite from other models, it is consistent with the debate between economic 
growth and environmental protection (Sunstein 2007; Cole 1999), especially 
during the mid-2000s in the international discourse (Andresen and Hey 2005; 
Rosen 2015), which have downscaled to sub-national collective acceptance to 
carry the costs of GHG mitigation (Cortell and Davis 1996).
Energy use was very likely to increase GHG emissions’ trend, as expected, 
since societies are heavily dependent on fossil fuels, which is corroborated to the 
transmission effect of GHG lags from the two previous years to the current, except 
in the treatment (d) model (Aghion et al. 2014; Magazzino 2016; Bhattacharya, 
Awaworyi, and Paramati 2017). In addition, results reported that countries with 
higher levels of GDP per capita presented lower emissions (tables 2 and 3), which 
negative coefficient was consistent with Bhattacharya, Awaworyi and Paramati 
(2017) , whose model was also a System GMM, but with a focus on renewable 
and non-renewable energy effects on GDP and  emissions. Theory-wise, it 
might indicate that countries with higher economic capability, which are likely to 
be the industrialized ones, are also the most capable ones to mitigate emissions 
(Jänicke 1992; Lehtonen 2004). The lagged coefficients indicated that GHG 
emissions were “sticky”, but its effect was reduced in the second year (tables 2 
and 3), and there was no autocorrelation for prior years after the second.
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Conclusion
This study considered a first hypothesis, which analyzed the effectiveness 
of distinct implemented levels of KP (four treatment effects), based upon the 
relative reduction in emissions’ trend compared to another group of control 
countries (Keohane 1984; Young 2013). A second hypothesis considered that 
domestic institutions influence on the country’s cooperation for the achievement 
of international institutions goals, such as KP (Mitchell 2013; Martin and Simmons 
1998; Cortell and Davis 1996). We employed a difference-in-difference statistical 
approach, since the result of time and treatment interaction provides the estimated 
isolated treatment effect on the treated group (Lechner 2010; Abadie 2005). The 
operationalization was conducted by the system GMM method to account for 
both unobservable heterogeneities among countries and endogeneity processes, 
especially owing to institutional effect and income (Arellano and Bover 1995; 
Arellano and Bond 1991).
In summary, the isolated effect of treatments associated with KP’s implemented 
levels presented low effectiveness (but not ineffectiveness) in alleviating the 
trend of emissions on the treated group relative to its counterpart, which was 
displayed by the not statistically significant DD parameters in most equations. 
However, results indicated that not only formal and defined rules, such as 
binding targets but also the international discourse and repercussion of KP were 
influential factors to reduce the likelihood of increasing emissions. Especially 
among the Non-Annex I group, the demonstration of intent to cooperate with 
KP combined with the Protocol’s support mechanisms was much likely to have 
avoided emissions, as displayed by the statistically significant coefficient of DD 
estimator and the reduction of the likelihood of an increase in emissions’ trend 
(Tables 4 and 6).
Results indicated that the influence of domestic institutions over GHG 
emissions was statistically significate in most cases, and even higher than the 
effect of KP’s associated treatments. Nevertheless, political, legal rights, and 
economic institutions affect emissions differently, and not necessarily higher 
institutional quality was associated with higher mitigation. In general, increased 
political freedom and democracy were influential to reduce emissions, which 
was consistent with the tolerance and the inclusion of climate responsibility 
topics on the domestic agenda. However, the higher institutional quality of the 
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enforcement of legal rights was likely to increase emissions’ levels, which might 
be associated with the unequal distribution of rights to polluter actors.
On Annex B group of KP (treatment (d)), the effects of political and legal 
rights institutional qualities were the opposite from other treatments (a) to (c) 
and indicated that laws, rules, and regulations were beneficial to GHG mitigation, 
while democratic pressure corresponded to higher emissions. Lastly, institutions 
associated with market freedom and market mechanisms were linked to elevated 
emissions’ trend, but in lower magnitude than the other two institutional indexes, 
and not being statistically significant on Annex B treatment. This might indicate 
that domestic market mechanisms were less effective to constrain emissions in 
comparison to democracy but less impactful than legal rights associated with 
polluter actors to increase emissions.
Lastly, the international discourse might have influenced compliance since 
the results suggested that emissions’ trends during 2005-2012 were more likely 
to increase GHG emissions than in the other two periods analyzed for three out 
of the four treatments analyzed. In addition, the rapid growth of middle-income 
countries within the international arena highlighted economic growth and social 
development, while climate issues were less prioritized. Besides, the groups in 
all samples were likely to be dependent on technologies that emit GHG, with a 
low pace of change to less environmentally detrimental ones, since the emissions 
from two previous years were carried over the current period in three out of the 
four models, while in the remaining model, it was only in one year prior. 
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